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The objective of this research is to analyze whether the political-ideological situation of municipali-
ties affects their debt level, considering evidence from Portugal for the period 2004-2013. A static 
panel data model is applied, incorporating factors such as political ideology, political-electoral 
cycle, governance format, coincidence of the political parties between Local Executive and Local 
Assembly and coincidence of the political parties between the Local Executive and Central Govern-
ment. An additional variable to control the effects of the economic crisis between 2008 and 2010 
is also considered. Based on the assumptions of the public choice theory, findings show a statisti-
cally significant relationship for the political-electoral cycle, allowing the conclusion that, given the 
evidence from Portuguese municipalities, debt increases in election years. Nevertheless, this is the 
only factor in the political-ideological circumstances that was found to be relevant in its effect on 
local authorities’ debt levels. It is also clear that the financial crisis in the period 2008-2010 likewise 
had a positive impact.
The paper contributes to the strengthening of the debate on the association between municipali-
ties’ political circumstances and debt, namely, in regards to strategic (electoral) debt cycles in local 
government.
1. Introduction
The international economic panorama, namely, the 
high levels of public debt in various countries, has led 
to increased interest in studying this topic. Thus, a con-
siderable amount of research has tried to analyze debt 
in both central and local governments.
Concerning the analysis of debt in Local Govern-
ment, there have been various types of studies. Most 
are related to the hypothesis of the existence of stra-
tegic debt (political) cycles, to the identification of 
determinant factors, attempting to understand how 
they influence debt, and to the subject of institutional 
restrictions imposed on debt levels, fundamentally by 
the State but also, for example, by financial markets.
The emergence of the public choice theory led to 
new, fundamentally positive, approaches (Veiga & 
Veiga, 2005). Accordingly, greater importance is given 
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to individuals (politicians, electors, citizens, etc.) being 
selfish and rational in the attempt to maximize util-
ity (Mueller, 1976). Based on this idea, Musgrave and 
Musgrave (1989) indicate that politicians try to maxi-
mize votes (adopting opportunistic behavior) to reach 
power and maintain it.
In this context, it is evident that political factors 
can be the basis for setting public policies, namely, 
economic/budgetary ones. This study draws upon this 
idea, aiming to understand whether the municipalities’ 
political-ideological circumstances (namely, political 
ideology, political-electoral cycle, form of governance, 
the political party of the Executive in face of the ma-
jority in the Municipal Assembly, and the political 
party leading the Municipal Executive in face of the 
party in Central Government) affect their debt levels. 
Data from Portuguese municipalities are used, cover-
ing the period 2004 to 2013, with panel data analysis 
models. This methodology was found to be adequate 
as it allows simultaneous analysis of inter-municipal 
(cross-sectional dimension) and over time variations 
(temporal dimension).
The institutional and legal framework of munici-
palities’ debt in Portugal is regulated by the financial 
regime established in the Local Finance Law (Diário 
da República, 2007). According to this, as well as to 
the Constitution, municipalities have financial auton-
omy, meaning that they run their own budget, expen-
ditures and property, they can levy taxes within the 
legal limits, and they can contract debt also accord-
ing to the requirements within their financial regime 
(Article 3). Under the principle of national solidarity, 
local finances have to be coordinated with the State’s 
finances, contributing to the balance and financial 
sustainability of the public sector accounts as a whole 
(Article 5).
Municipalities’ debt might embrace long- and 
short-term bank loans, financial leasing, local bonds 
and current debt to suppliers. Debt limits are estab-
lished by law (Articles 36-37), and the regime for loans 
is likewise regulated (Articles 38-39). In the case of 
exceeding debt limits or risking default, municipali-
ties have to present to the Local Government General 
Department a plan for financial recovery (Articles 40-
41) given that the State does not assume responsibil-
ity for any of their liabilities or commitments (Article 
43). Any deviations from the targets established in the 
financial recovery plan may lead to a penalty by the 
Central Government, which retains part of the trans-
fers the municipality is entitled to until the situation is 
settled (Article 41).
The Central Government can, however, create some 
lines of support, in the form of subsidies of especial 
loans, to allow for the financial recovery of those mu-
nicipalities in more financial difficulties, which has 
happened in the last five years, with some supporting fi-
nancial programs, such as PAEL (Carvalho et al., 2014).
In the last decade, Portuguese municipalities’ debt 
has been approximately 2/3 long-term bank loans and 
financial leasing and 1/3 current debt to suppliers and 
short-term bank loans, reaching the highest amount 
in 2010 with 8,693 million euros. Financial indepen-
dency (the rate of proper revenue over total revenue) 
has been on average 33% since 2007, with a minimum 
of 31% in 2009 when debt reached the highest level of 
11%; on average, transfers and grants from the Cen-
tral Government have ranged between 58% of the total 
revenue in 2009 and 64% in 2012. Financial dependen-
cy from these transfers and grants is high in small mu-
nicipalities (below 20,000 inhabitants); on average, ap-
proximately 70%; large municipalities (above 150,000 
inhabitants) almost reach this average for financial in-
dependency; that is, proper revenue has been over 60% 
since 2007 given that in large cities, they benefit from 
higher rates and amounts of property taxes (Carvalho 
et al., 2014).
The clearly limited studies about local debt, espe-
cially those carried out in Portugal, and the growing 
international interest in studying the behavior of local 
authorities’ debt, create an opportunity for this paper 
to make a significant contribution. A particularity of 
this investigation, which may also be considered an 
important addition to the international literature, is 
the use of a dependent variable (net per capita debt) 
that is calculated based on the balance sheet and not 
on the budget accomplished, as previous studies have 
done1. Given that it is based on the information con-
tained in each municipality balance sheet, which these 
authorities only started to elaborate after publication 
of the Official Chart of Accounts for Local Govern-
ment (POCAL)2, the period of study became limited 
at the beginning because it is believed that municipali-
ties’ financial statements began presenting more com-
plete and reliable information from 2004.
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Following this introduction, section 2 addresses a 
brief literature review on the public choice theory and 
on the political-ideological determinants of municipal 
debt. Methodological issues are described in section 
3, namely, the research problem and objective, the hy-
potheses and variables, and the method of statistical 
treatment. Section 4 presents the results and discusses 
the hypotheses. Finally, the main conclusions are sum-
marized, and some lines of further development of the 
research are suggested in section 5.
2. Literature review
2.1. Theory of public choice
The theory of public choice developed in particular 
from the works of Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and 
Ostrom (1971). Mueller (1976) explains that this theory 
studies the process related to decision-making in po-
litical contexts, using theoretical and methodological 
assumptions originating in economic science. In this 
context, Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) add that po-
litical competence allows politicians to act according 
to electors’ interests, just as economic competence is 
based on consumers’ preferences in defining the supply.
The basic postulates associated with the public 
choice consider, as in economic theory, the individual 
to be selfish, rational and maximizing utility (Mueller 
1976). From this idea, Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) 
argue that politicians try to maximize votes to achieve 
power and maintain it. As for electors, they vote for the 
politicians they believe best represent their interests.
According to Pereira (1997), the democratic politi-
cal process may be analyzed as a competitive market, 
in which politicians, citizens, civil servants and others, 
have fundamentally egocentric motivations.
Therefore, based on the ideas presented above, the 
analysis of the political process, elaborated within the 
scope of the theory of public choice, is found to fol-
low the same principles as agency theory3 (Ferreira, 
2011a). In these terms, the politician is the agent, while 
the principals are citizens/electors, opposition parties, 
creditors, control organs and non-governmental or-
ganizations, among others. For Zimmerman (1977), 
delegation of authority by citizens to politicians may 
create an agency problem, with the expectation that 
the agent (politician) will not always act in the best in-
terests of the principal (citizens, electors, etc.).
For Ferreira (2011a), a consequence of the positive 
approach to the theory of public choice4 is that the 
politician is motivated to manipulate economic policies 
to his own advantage in an attempt to maximize votes 
(which is opportunistic behavior according to Serralde 
Miguez (2000). Considering that votes can be won 
through public expenditures and can generally be lost 
through visible tax increases, in democratic regimes, 
there is a tendency to create budget deficits. In addi-
tion, governments get involved in political-economic 
cycles, characterized by increased public spending/debt 
in the pre-election period, followed by inflationist ten-
sion and restrictive policies after the election (Pereira, 
1997). Based on this type of action, the possibility arises 
of economic cycles conditioned by electoral periods, 
i.e., political-budgetary cycles (Rogoff, 1990).
In the sphere of political-budgetary cycles, a line of 
research emerged relating the study of debt to political 
cycles. This line of research, introduced by Persson and 
Svensson (1989), in a study applied to Central Govern-
ment, is normally referred to as ‘strategic cycles of 
debt’. The basic idea of the main models is that politi-
cians in power try to create limitations for future gov-
ernments by resorting to debt. The amount of debt will 
be greater, the greater the ideological difference in rela-
tion to the composition of public expenditures (Ash-
worth, Geys, & Heyndels, 2005; Escudero Fernández 
and Prior Jiménez, 2002; Persson & Svensson, 1989).
Following the work by Persson and Svensson 
(1989), the line of research regarding strategic cycles 
of debt has developed considerably, particularly with 
the works of Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Aghion 
and Bolton (1990), Milesi-Ferreti (1995), Martimort 
(2001), Sutter (2003) and Lami and Imami (2013), 
among others.
The study of strategic cycles of debt has also 
emerged in research applied to Local Government, ini-
tiated by the work of Pettersson-Lidbom (2001), which 
was followed by many others, namely, Salinas Jiménez 
and Álvarez García (2002), Escudero Fernández and 
Prior Jiménez (2002), Fernández Llera, García Valiñas 
and Cantarero Prieto (2003; 2004), Borge (2005), Ash-
worth et al. (2005), Goeminne and Smolders (2008), 
Vila i Vila (2010) and Sánchez Mier (2011). In several 
studies, the analysis of the strategic cycle of debt is re-
lated to political parties and to governments’ political 
strength (Benito, Bastida, & Muñoz, 2010).
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2.2. The political-ideological situation and 
municipal debt
Public choice theory, as one explanatory theory of debt, 
allows identification of a range of factors able to influ-
ence debt levels in the context of Local Government.
According to Vallés Giménez (2002), the various 
determinant factors of debt can be grouped into three 
types: institutional, fiscal and economic. At the same 
time, however, the same author considers this classi-
fication to be subject to personal interpretation, and 
so, there could be many others. The interpretation of 
Fernández Llera et al. (2003; 2004) led them to group 
factors in the same way as Vallés Giménez (2002), 
having studied socio-economic (institutional and 
economic), political and budgetary (financial) factors. 
Zafra Gómez, Plata Díaz and Pérez López (2009), in 
turn, consider the determinant factors of debt can be 
divided into external and internal. External aspects 
include those of a social, economic and political na-
ture. Variables related to entities’ financing are con-
sidered internal. Ribeiro (2012) presents a model of 
structural equations, identifying the different situa-
tions able to influence municipal debt. He therefore 
studies institutional, fiscal, budgetary and economic 
situations.
Although the situations and determinants that 
might influence debt may be of different natures, the 
current study focuses on determinants related to the 
political-ideological situation. Bearing in mind the 
statistically non-significant results of other studies, it 
intends to show that the ideological-political stability 
prevailing in the Portuguese municipalities configures 
a greater influence of such factors in relation to debt.
In this context, the factors included in the political-
ideological setting and considered determinants of 
debt are generally related to the form of governance, 
political ideology and electoral cycles. These factors 
have been studied by various authors, highlighting that 
the results obtained are not always significant and are 
often in disagreement.
Political ideology is certainly one of the most stud-
ied factors in the international literature. Authors such 
as López Laborda and Vallés Giménez (2002), Salinas 
Jiménez and Álvarez García (2002, 2003), Ashworth et 
al. (2005), Hagen and Vabo (2005), Geys (2007), Tov-
mo (2007), Vila i Vila (2010), Ferreira (2011b), Guil-
lamón, Benito, & Bastida (2011) and Bastida, Beyaert, 
& Benito (2013) distinguish parties on the right and 
on the left, attempting to assess how their ideological 
action is associated with debt. The basic hypothesis 
does not coincide in the different studies; therefore, 
Vallés Giménez (2002) and López Laborda and Vallés 
Giménez (2002) raise some doubts as to which par-
ties have a greater tendency toward debt, concluding 
that the sign of the relationship with debt will be inde-
terminate. Feld and Kirchgässner (2001), Pettersson-
Lidbom (2001), Salinas Jiménez and Álvarez García 
(2002, 2003), Hagen and Vabo (2005), Ashworth et 
al. (2005), Geys (2007), Tovmo (2007) and Vila i Vila 
(2010) start from the idea that left-wing parties, be-
ing more in favor of public intervention, will be more 
likely to present higher levels of debt. The same hy-
pothesis was assumed by Kieweit and Szakaly (1996), 
Bastida Albadalejo and Benito López (2005), Zafra 
Gómez et al. (2011), Letelier (2011) and Sánchez Mier 
(2011), recognizing that progressive parties, usually 
favoring a larger public sector with increased func-
tions, will present higher levels of debt than conserva-
tive parties.
Kieweit and Szakaly (1996) validated the hypothesis 
that conservative parties are less prone to debt. In turn, 
Ashworth et al. (2005) obtained a result they classify 
as unexpected; they found that left-wing parties, even 
with higher levels of expenditure, presented lower debt. 
This was also concluded by Pettersson-Lidbom (2001), 
showing that right-wing parties increased debt when 
they anticipate losing the election. As to the remaining 
analysis from the authors mentioned above, they did 
not allow validating any of the hypotheses established 
because the results were not statistically significant. So, 
they did not find evidence that parties’ ideological dif-
ferentiation interfered in any way in debt.
The relationship between political cycles and debt 
was studied by authors such as Pettersson-Lidbom 
(2001), Vallés Giménez (2002), López Laborda and 
Vallés Giménez (2002), Salinas Jiménez and Ál-
varez García (2002; 2003), Fernández Llera et al. 
(2003; 2004), Escudero Fernández and Prior Jiménez 
(2002b), Ashworth et al.(2005), Geys (2007), Agundez 
Alvarez and Baza Román (2008), Hájek and Hájková 
(2009), Vila i Vila (2010), Zafra Gómez et al. (2011), 
Letelier (2011), Ferreira (2011b), Sánchez Mier (2011) 
and Bastida et al. (2013). In general, they all try to 
validate the hypothesis that at election time, there is 
Vizja Press&ITwww.ce.vizja.pl
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a tendency to increase debt. There are, however, some 
variants, particularly those related to the ideology of 
the parties in government and the expectations of be-
ing re-elected.
The results of these studies were not consensual. 
Fernández Llera et al. (2004), Vallés Giménez (2002) 
and Vila i Vila (2010) found a negative relationship, 
i.e., they did not validate the hypothesis of increased 
debt in pre-election and election years. Fernández 
Llera et al. (2004) justify this, saying it can be related 
to the fact that, often, the local Executive does not have 
a majority, which can make recourse to debt difficult. 
Vallés Giménez (2002) explains that this may arise 
from reforms in the financing system introduced in the 
period of analysis, which created additional resources 
(income), and so there may have been no need to turn 
to debt.
The studies by Pettersson-Lidbom (2001), Fernán-
dez Llera et al. (2003), Ashworth et al. (2005), Escude-
ro Fernández and Prior Jiménez (2002), Geys (2007), 
Agundez Alvarez and Baza Román (2008), Zafra Gó-
mez et al. (2011), Ferreira (2011b) and Letelier (2011) 
validated the initial hypothesis, concluding that local 
Executives increase debt in election periods in an at-
tempt to maximize their chances for re-election or, on 
the other hand, to limit their possible successor’s ac-
tion. Letelier (2011) additionally concluded that great-
er fragmentation of parties in government gives rise to 
higher levels of debt.
Escudero Fernández and Prior Jiménez (2002) 
found that debt is indeed relied on in pre-electoral 
years, adjusting for lower levels in the following 
years (electoral and post-electoral). This adjustment 
gives governments a margin to once again increase 
debt when the next election is approaching. Another 
conclusion was that political-budgetary cycles create 
increased levels of accumulated debt because adjust-
ments in the election and post-election years do not 
make up for the increase in the pre-election year.
Ashworth et al. (2005) introduced a particularity 
in these studies while analyzing short- and long-term 
debt. They concluded that, more significantly in rela-
tion to short-term debt, there is a strategic cycle that 
is affected by government fragmentation. In a study 
in which the sample was essentially the same, Geys 
(2007) arrives at the same conclusions but in relation 
to long-term debt. 
On the contrary, Vila i Vila (2010) does not validate 
the hypothesis, finding that debt diminishes as elec-
tions come closer. Observing the fact that being a mi-
nority government does not hinder access to debt, he 
justifies the results by explaining that debt will not be a 
good ‘visiting card’ to present at election time, and so 
municipal budgets in electoral years try to minimize 
it. Sánchez Mier (2011) also failed to validate the hy-
pothesis of the existence of a strategic cycle of debt in 
Spanish municipalities. Like Vila i Vila (2010), he finds 
a tendency to reduce debt in election periods, which is 
subsequently altered.
Finally, López Laborda and Vallés Giménez (2002), 
Salinas Jiménez and Álvarez García (2002, 2003), 
Hájek and Hájková (2009) and Sánchez Mier (2011) 
did not obtain statistically significant results, being un-
able to demonstrate any relationship between political 
cycles and debt.
Another political factor much dealt with in the liter-
ature is related to the coincidence of parties in Local and 
Central Government. López Laborda and Vallés Gimé-
nez (2002) consider that Central Government could 
financially benefit Local Government when this is the 
case, and so recourse to debt could be less. Fernández 
Llera et al. (2003) establish that the relationship may be 
ambiguous as, on the one hand, Central Government 
could benefit Local Government financially, but on the 
other hand, it could be negligent regarding control of 
debt limits. Therefore, they suggest the relationship 
could be indeterminate. Nevertheless, the results ob-
tained by all these authors do not present significant 
statistical evidence, so their initial hypotheses were not 
validated. 
The type of governance is often studied through the 
government’s political strength/fragmentation. In this 
context, a majority or minority government was con-
sidered a determinant for debt by Salinas Jiménez and 
Álvarez García (2002; 2003). These authors indicate 
that a majority government will mean less yielding 
to the minority. Therefore, by not having to increase 
public expenditures, local authorities will also not 
need more debt. The strength/fragmentation5 of power 
will mean a greater need of resources and therefore 
more debt (Ashworth et al., 2005; Borge, 2005; Geys, 
2007; Hagen & Vabo, 2005; Hájek & Hájková, 2009; 
Letelier, 2011; Sánchez Mier, 2011; Tovmo, 2007; Vila 
i Vila, 2010; Zafra Gómez et al., 2011). Guillamón et 
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al. (2011) and Bastida et al. (2013) explain that greater 
strength will lead to less debt. In turn, Vallés Giménez 
(2002) and López Laborda and Vallés Giménez (2002) 
consider the same factor, designating it as the political 
market and purchase of votes to achieve governability 
through coalitions. Feld and Kirchgässner (2001) did 
not expect to find a significant impact of this variable 
on debt, as at least two of the four largest parties were 
part of local Executives.
Despite their initial expectation, Guillamón et al. 
(2011) finally obtained contrary evidence; they find 
that the greater the local executive strength, the greater 
the debt is. The authors suggest that it can be related 
to the fact that a stronger government may consider 
it has great political legitimacy and so is not averse to 
resorting to debt when necessary. The results obtained 
by the other authors did not present significant values.
3. Research methodology
3.1. Problem and objective
The issue that is the basis of this paper concerns the 
possibility of the political-ideological circumstances 
influencing debt in Local Government. Therefore, the 
intention is, learning from the context of Portuguese 
municipalities, to develop a model that can provide 
both local authorities’ managers and external control-
ling bodies useful information, so that they can man-
age and control debt, which is a critical aspect of finan-
cial management in the public sector.
The objective, in particular, is to understand wheth-
er the political-ideological situation of municipalities 
influences their debt levels, using data from all 308 
Portuguese municipalities for the period 2004 to 20136.
3.2. Hypotheses and variables
The model’s dependent variable will be net per capita 
debt (ENDLIQ). The calculation of this indicator was 
based on what is set out in the regulations in force for 
the jurisdiction in question, namely, the European 
System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA) 
and Article 36 (n. 1) of the Portuguese Local Finance 
Law (LFL), in force for the analyzed period7. It will 
therefore be calculated by the difference between the 
amount of financial liabilities (short-, medium- and 
long-term debts) and the amount of financial assets 
(short-, medium- and long-term amounts to be re-
ceived from third parties, negotiable securities, bank 
deposits and cash balance) as of 31 December, divided 
by the total number of inhabitants. According to the 
LFL, the calculation of net debt should be consolidat-
ed, i.e., it should include the proportion of the munici-
pality’s participation in the capital of municipal asso-
ciations and the local business sector. However, due to 
the difficulty of accessing information, this study will 
only consider the net debt of municipalities’ individual 
accounts.
The hypotheses concerning the independent vari-
ables8 are described and justified as follows. They draw 
from the literature, particularly the examples referred 
to in section 2.2.
I) Political ideology
According to the theory of public choice, as a function 
of their political ideology, parties can present differ-
ent objectives, and when in power in municipalities, 
they can follow policies that favor electors who sup-
ported them (Escudero Fernández and Prior Jiménez, 
2002). Therefore, there may be differences with regard 
to expenditures carried out, which may lead to differ-
ent levels of debt. In addition, considering the coercive 
isomorphism of institutional theory (Dimaggio and 
Powell, 1983), the pressure political parties put on the 
municipality leaders associated with them may also 
differentiate their action in relation to debt.
Although, as explained, the study of debt associ-
ated with political ideology is usually related to dif-
ferentiation between left-wing/progressive and right-
wing/conservative parties, there is no unanimity as 
to the relationship this differentiation can have with 
debt. Nevertheless, bearing in mind the political par-
ties that normally lead Portuguese municipalities, we 
set out from the idea that, as left-wing parties have a 
greater tendency for public intervention, they will also 
be more likely to present greater expenditure, which 
may mean higher levels of debt. Therefore, the follow-
ing hypothesis was formulated:
H1: Debt is greater in municipalities led by left-wing 
parties than in those led by right-wing parties
To distinguish between municipalities led by left-
wing and right-wing parties, a dichotomic variable is 
used, taking the value 1 if the municipality is led by 
a left-wing party or coalition and 0 if the municipal-
ity is led by a right-wing party or coalition9. In cases 
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of municipalities led by independents, an analysis of 
their leaders’ political past was made to make a clas-
sification within the above-mentioned dichotomy. This 
procedure was adopted, as it was considered that, in 
many cases, independent leaders are party dissidents.
II) Political cycle
In the context of the public choice theory, various 
authors have attempted to establish a relationship be-
tween the political-electoral cycle and debt. As present-
ed, they tried to validate the existence of what is known 
as ‘strategic debt cycles’. The hypothesis usually consid-
ered is that in election periods, local Executives have a 
tendency to increase debt due to a greater tendency to 
increase expenditure. This occurs due to the attempt to 
maximize the probability of re-election or, on the other 
hand, as an attempt to limit their successor’s actions.
The results obtained by Ribeiro and Jorge (2013) let 
us conclude that in the period 2004 to 200910, there were 
strategic debt cycles in Portuguese local authorities. 
However, some authors confirm a negative relationship; 
that is, they do not validate the hypothesis of increased 
debt in pre-election and election years. As observed, 
Fernández Llera et al. (2004) explain this result by the 
possibility of the municipality often not having a ma-
jority, which hinders recourse to debt. This justification 
does not greatly apply to Portuguese municipalities, as 
relatively few are found to be led by a minority11.
Therefore, for more consistent validation, also based 
on the results of previous studies, which found that 
municipalities increase debt in election periods, the 
following hypothesis was put forward:
H2: Municipalities’ debt is greater in election years
In studying strategic debt cycles, many authors con-
sider that the election period corresponds to the elec-
tion year and the preceding year. However, during the 
period of analysis for this research, both local elections 
in Portugal were held in October. This fact led us to 
consider that increased net per capita debt could only 
occur in the election years. Therefore, to define politi-
cal cycles, another dichotomic variable is used, taking 
the value 1 for the election year and 0 otherwise.
III) Form of governance
Salinas Jiménez and Álvarez García (2002; 2003), Vila 
i Vila (2010) and Sánchez Mier (2011) consider that 
a majority Executive will mean less yielding to the 
minority and therefore less need of resources. On the 
contrary, power-sharing will mean more concession 
and a greater need for resources, which could lead to 
greater debt.
Considering, in addition, the conclusions of Ash-
worth et al. (2005), Hagen and Vabo (2005), Borge 
(2005), Geys (2007), Tovmo (2007), Vila i Vila (2010), 
Zafra Gómez et al. (2011) and Letelier (2011), that co-
alition governments, being more fragmented and less 
strong politically, resort more to debt, a negative rela-
tionship with debt is expected in the case of a major-
ity government; hence, the following hypothesis was 
established:
H3: Debt is lower in municipalities led by a majority 
than in those led by a minority
Another dichotomic variable is defined to distin-
guish local authorities based on their form of gover-
nance, taking the value 1 for a majority government 
and 0 for a minority government.
IV) Political party in the Executive coinciding with 
that of the majority in the Municipal Assembly
As this hypothesis is not usual in the international 
literature, it seems important to consider it given the 
particularities of Portuguese municipalities, explained 
as follows.
As the Municipal Assembly operates as the first or-
gan of (political) control of the Executive’s action, it is 
assumed there could be greater difficulty in approving 
recourse to debt if the majority party does not coincide 
with the party in the Executive. Ideological reasons, 
budgetary constraints or other factors can lead the 
majority party in the Municipal Assembly, different 
from that of the Executive, to not approve recourse to 
debt. Moreover, according to the public choice theory, 
that majority can use their veto in an attempt to harm 
the action of the party leading the municipality and to 
maximize the possibility of a mayor from their party 
being elected to the Executive in the next election. It 
is therefore expected that when the parties coincide, 
there will be more recourse to debt. Hence, the hy-
pothesis is as follows:
H4: Debt is greater in municipalities where the politi-
cal party in the Executive coincides with that of the ma-
jority in the Municipal Assembly
As for some of the previous hypotheses, a dicho-
tomic variable was defined likewise, taking the value 
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1 when the political party of the Executive coincides 
with that of the majority in the Municipal Assembly 
and 0 otherwise. Coalitions are considered to coincide 
as long as one of the parties does.
V) Political party of the local Executive coinciding 
with the one in Central Government
Based on the public choice theory, various authors have 
approached the relationship between debt and coin-
ciding parties in Local and Central Governments. As 
presented, the main idea is that, for political reasons, 
Central Government may financially benefit the local 
authority when parties coincide, increasing the amounts 
transferred and hence implying less recourse to debt 
from the latter. Still, some authors highlight the fact that 
the relationship may be ambiguous: Central Govern-
ment may benefit Local Government, but it could also 
be more lenient with regard to control of debt limits.
In the specific case of Portuguese municipalities, the 
Local Finance Law sets out the general criteria for at-
tributing transfers from Central to Local Government, 
which means differentiation can only be made in spe-
cific circumstances (program-contracts, agreements in 
specific areas, etc.). Nevertheless, it is believed that in 
the Portuguese case, there is a considerable likelihood 
of Central Government favoring financially certain 
municipalities, fundamentally through transfers, when 
the same party is in power. So, the following hypoth-
esis is established:
H5: Debt is lower in municipalities when the political 
party of the local Executive coincides with the party in 
Central Government
Also for this hypothesis, a dichotomic variable is 
defined, taking the value 1 when the political party of 
the Executive and the party in Central Government 
coincide and 0 otherwise.
Hypotheses Variables Form of calculation
Expected 
relation
H1 Political ideology (IDEOL)
1 when municipalities are led by a left-wing party or 
coalition
0 when municipalities are led by a right-wing party 
or coalition
+
H2 Political cycle (CICEL)
1 for election year 
0 for other years
+
H3 Form of governance (FGOV)
1 when municipalities are led by a majority Executive
0 when municipalities are led by a minority Executive
-
H4
Political party of the Executive 
coinciding with the majority 
party in the Municipal 
Assembly (COINCCMAM)
1 when parties coincide
0 when parties do not coincide 
+
H5
Political party of the Executive 
coinciding with the one 
in Central Government 
(COINCCMGC)
1 when parties coincide
0 when parties do not coincide
-
Control variable
Crisis period (PCRISE)
1 for crisis period (2008, 2009 e 2010)
0 for other years
+
Table 1. Variables, form of calculation and expected relationship with debt
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VI) Crisis period (control variable)
The time frame of analysis considered in this paper 
(2004-2013) embraces a period that is generally known 
as a worldwide financial crisis – the three-year period 
2008-2010. It is commonly acknowledge that during 
these circumstances, the public sector debt level in 
general increased, as well as local authorities’ debt. In 
the case of Portuguese municipalities, such a trend is 
shown by Carvalho et al. (2014). To catch this effect, 
a control dichotomic variable is defined, assuming the 
value 1 in those years and 0 in the others.
Table 1 summarizes the variables underlying the 
hypotheses (which were defined also based on the in-
ternational literature and on the arguments presented 
above), the ways they are calculated and the expected 
relationship with debt.
3.3. Statistical treatment
The influence the political-ideological circumstances 
can have on debt in Portuguese municipalities is stud-
ied in this paper by using the methodology of panel 
data analysis. The models established are validated to 
find a final version.
Panel data analysis fits adequately with this type 
of study, as it allows simultaneous analysis of inter-
municipal variations (sectional dimension) and over 
time (temporal dimension), in this case from 2004 
to 2013. This methodology has been used by other 
authors, such as Kieweit and Szakaly (1996), López 
Laborda and Vallés Giménez (2002), Vallés Giménez, 
Pascual Arzoz, Cabasés Hita (2003), Fernández Llera 
et al. (2003), Hagen and Vabo (2005), Pascual Arzoz, 
Cabasés Hita and Roberto Ezcurra (2008) and Sánchez 
Mier (2011).
To begin with, as in Aparicio and Márquez (2005), 
models with pooled data are used and estimated by the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. Homogeneity 
is therefore assumed in the constant part and in the 
slope of regressions for all municipalities.
The consideration that the constant is common for 
all municipalities as well as the slope is a quite restric-
tive condition. It is more realistic to consider that each 
municipality has its own characteristics, i.e., an indi-
vidual character. Therefore, it is important to statisti-
cally consider the heterogeneity of individuals, and 
thus, both the fixed effects model and the random ef-
fects model in panel analysis are used.
In the fixed effects model, estimation is made as-
suming the heterogeneity of municipalities is captured 
in the constant part, which differs from one munici-
pality to another. As for the random effects model, 
estimation is made considering the heterogeneity of 
municipalities in the error term; the constant is con-
sidered as a non-observable random parameter and 
not as a fixed parameter.
Once the above three models are defined, there is a 
need to carry out tests to define the model to use. The 
tests proposed by Breusch & Pagan and the F test are 
performed to decide between the OLS model and the 
random effects and fixed effects model, respectively 
(Aparicio and Márquez, 2005). In addition, the Haus-
man test is used to decide which of the two models 
(random effects or fixed effects) is more appropriate.
After defining the model to use, the possible ex-
istence of problems of heteroskedasticity, contempo-
rary correlation and autocorrelation is analyzed. For 
this purpose, the Wald Modification test, the Pesaran 
test and the Wooldridge test are performed (Apari-
cio and Márquez, 2005). If these problems exist, the 
Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) and the 
Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) estimators 
are used.
Considering that, as in Aparicio and Márquez (2005), 
the estimation with the PCSE model is revealed to be 
more efficient than with the FGLS model, the results ob-
tained from that estimation are those to be used.
4. Presentation of the results and 
discussion of the hypotheses
The results of estimating the model using a pooled re-
gression (OLS), Fixed Effects and Random Effects, as 
well as from performing the Breusch & Pagan, F and 
Hausman tests, are displayed in Table 2.
The results of the Breusch & Pagan test lead to the 
rejection of the null hypothesis (significance = 0.000) 
that non-observable individual effects are relevant in 
explaining debt. Therefore, it can be concluded that it 
is preferable to use the estimation using the random ef-
fects model instead of the OLS. Carrying out the F test 
(significance = 0.000), in turn, leads to the observation 
that the fixed effects model should be used.
Considering the evidence that both the random ef-
fects and the fixed effects models are preferable to the 
OLS model, the Hausman test helps to decide which of 
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the two to use. The results of the test indicate that one 
cannot reject the null hypothesis (significance = 0.815) 
of absence of correlation between the non-observable 
individual effects and the explanatory variables. There-
fore, the estimation must be performed using the 
random effects model, which is finally revealed as the 
most appropriate.
As explained previously, to check for the existence 
of problems related to the violation of independence 
when the errors of the different individuals are corre-
lated (contemporary correlation), the errors for each 
individual are correlated in time (autocorrelation), and 
the “identical” distribution of the errors is violated when 
the variance is not constant (heteroskedasticity), the 
Pesaran, Wooldridge and Wald Modification tests were 
used. The results allow the conclusion that the estima-
tions suffer from these problems, so to solve them, the 
Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) and Panel 
Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) models were con-
sidered (results also displayed in Table 2). Aparicio and 
Márquez (2005) state that estimation with the PCSE is 
more rigorous because the standardized errors are more 
precise; hence, this is the estimated model finally con-
sidered, the results of which are going to be analyzed.
The results of the Wald test indicate (significance = 
0.000) that the explanatory variables can be considered 
relevant in explaining municipalities’ debt. Observing 
the estimation values, one can also conclude that two 
of the five independent variables, which present sta-
tistical significance, explain 57% (R2 = 0.570) of the 
variation observed in municipal debt, i.e., the model 
has good explanatory power.
Concerning the political-ideological variables, the 
results displayed in Table 2 in the estimation with the 
PCSE model show statistical significance (α = 0.05) 
only for CICEL. The control variable PCRISE is also 
found to present statistical significance (α = 0.1).
Considering the coefficients, it is not possible to 
corroborate hypothesis H1 (IDEOL). On the con-
trary, there is some evidence, although not statistically 
significant, consistent with the results presented by 
Kieweit and Szakaly (1996), Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) 
and Ashworth et al. (2005), that left-wing parties pres-
ent lower net per capita debt. Also in this study, as for 
Ashworth et al. (2005), this result was unexpected. 
However, it could indicate that political ideals are often 
not followed ‘to the letter’ by municipalities’ leaders 
when in power. Their proximity to the population may 
make them act more as a function of needs rather than 
based on the ideals of the party that they were elected 
for. Consequently, one can state that the results are not 
consistent with the doctrine of public choice theory on 
which the hypothesis was founded.
As for the hypothesis related to the political cycle 
(CICEL), the results suggest that Portuguese munici-
palities increased debt in election years. This increase 
will possibly be related to the increased expenditure 
in the election year in an attempt to maximize the 
chance of re-election. One can therefore validate H2, 
the results being supported by the public choice the-
ory, more specifically with strategic debt cycles. They 
are also consistent with those obtained by Pettersson-
Lidbom (2001), Escudero Fernández and Prior Jimé-
nez (2002b), Fernández Llera et al. (2003), Ashworth 
et al.(2005), Geys (2007), Agundez Alvarez and Baza 
Román (2008), Zafra Gómez et al. (2011), Ferreira 
(2011b), Letelier (2011), Bastida et al. (2013) and Ri-
beiro and Jorge (2013).
Regarding the form of governance (FGOV), one did 
not obtain statistically significant empirical evidence 
that would lead to corroborate hypothesis H3. Authors 
such as Feld and Kirchgässner (2001), Vallés Giménez 
(2002), López Laborda and Vallés Giménez (2002), Sa-
linas Jiménez and Álvarez García (2002; 2003), Hájek 
and Hájková (2009) and Sánchez Mier (2011) did not 
find significant evidence either. Nevertheless, consid-
ering the negative sign of the coefficient, there seems 
to be a tendency for a majority Executive to mean less 
concession to the minority and therefore less need for 
financial resources, among them debt.
As for the variable COINCCMAM, the results are 
not statistically significant, so it is not possible to vali-
date hypothesis H4 that debt is greater in municipali-
ties when the political party of the Executive coincides 
with the majority in the Municipal Assembly.
In the same line as the results presented by López 
Laborda and Vallés Giménez (2002) and Fernández 
Llera et al. (2003), one did not obtain statistical signifi-
cance that would allow validating hypothesis H5 on the 
relationship between debt and the political party of the 
local Executive coinciding with that of Central Gov-
ernment. However, the estimation of the model shows 
a negative sign for the variable COINCCMGC. This 
result suggests (although not significantly) that when 
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the political party of the Executive coincides with that 
of Central Government, municipality’s debt is lower. 
This fact may be explained by the possibility of Central 
Government favoring municipalities of the same party 
through subsidies or transfers made within the scope 
of specific circumstances, such as program contracts 
and agreements in specific areas, which may diminish 
the need for debt.
Finally, the control variable (PCRISE), while statisti-
cally significant with a positive coefficient, demonstrates 
that, in the years of the financial crisis, Portuguese mu-
nicipalities’ debt also increased, hence supporting the 
descriptive analysis by Carvalho et al. (2014).
5. Conclusion
The aim of this research was to offer further insights 
to understand whether the local authorities’ political-
ideological situation influence their debt levels. To this 
end, using evidence from Portuguese municipalities in 
the period 2004 to 2013, various determinant factors of 
a political-ideological nature were studied. Given that 
the period of analysis embraced the years of worldwide 
financial crisis, the possible effects of this were also 
considered in the analysis.
After a review of the international literature, funda-
mentally based in the theory of public choice, a model 
was defined to be estimated using a methodology of 
Variables
OLS Random Effects Fixed Effects FGLS PCSE
Coefficient T Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient z Coefficient z
IDEOL -0.061 -1.689 0.011 0.244 0.035 0.698 -0.026 -0.051 -0.047 -1.154
CICEL 0.054 1.458 0.050* 2.080 0.049* 2.067 0.174 1.166 0.085** 2.831
FGOV -0.063 -1.132 -0.095 -1.758 -0.100 -1.797 5.494*** 4.937 -0.093 -1.411
COINCCMAM -0.053 -0.581 0.112 1.472 0.128 1.648 -0.224 -0.199 0.024 0.377
COINCCMGC -0.031 -0.815 -0.049 -1.814 -0.051 -1.852 0.174 0.775 -0.034 -1.144
PCRISE 0.196*** 5.247 0.200*** 7.954 0.200*** 7.961 0.021 0.084 0.123* 2.544
CONS 6.286*** 61.982 6.127*** 62.791 6.105*** 67.468 0.000 6.210*** 58.071
Observations 3080  3080  3080  3080  3080  
R2 0.010 0.028 0.028 0.570
Wald (X2) 78.300*** 131.810*** 22.790***
Breusch & 
Pagan 
4895,960***
F 6.270*** 15.760***
Hausman (X2)   2.95        
Table 2. Results of the model estimation
Note: (1) The Breusch & Pagan test has 2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis that non-observable individual effects 
are not relevant in explaining the dependent variable, against the alternative hypothesis of their relevance in explaining the 
dependent variable. (2) The Hausman test has 2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis that non-observable individual 
effects are not correlated with the explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of correlation between non-ob-
servable individual effects and the explanatory variables.(3) The Wald test has 2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis 
of joint non-significance of the parameters of the explanatory variables against the alternative hypothesis of joint significance 
of the parameters of the explanatory variables. (4) The F test has normal distribution N (0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of 
joint non-significance of the estimated parameters against the alternative hypothesis of joint significance of the estimated 
parameters. (5) * Statistical significance of 10%; ** statistical significance of 5%; *** statistical significance of 1%.
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panel data analysis, including five variables representing 
the municipalities’ political-ideological setting, as well 
as a control variable for the effect of the financial crisis.
The results of estimating the model allow confirma-
tion for only the political-electoral cycle, validating 
the existence of strategic cycles of debt in Portuguese 
municipalities, which means an empirical validation of 
the fact that net debt in municipalities presents higher 
values in election years, possibly due to a greater ten-
dency to carry out expenditure, without increasing 
revenue from taxes, originating in the attempt to maxi-
mize the chances of re-election.
To try to avoid these cycles, Escudero Fernández 
and Prior Jiménez (2002) consider the possibility of 
extending the period of election cycles. However, we 
believe, as these authors do, that this approach to the 
problem would only produce results if the electoral pe-
riod is infinite, which is something realistically impos-
sible. Prevention of strategic debt cycles, in our opin-
ion, could be achieved with the introduction of new 
and stricter rules related to debt limits, which could 
include creating limitations to relevant budgetary vari-
ations in forecasted revenue and expenditure, above all 
in periods of approaching elections.
Another mechanism to prevent strategic cycles of 
debt relates to better accountability. Portuguese mu-
nicipalities must publish and disclose their annual ac-
counts (including on their official website); often the 
accounts are independently audited (articles 48 and 49 
of the LFL). However, we believe that the information 
reaching the electorate is extremely complex and does 
not provide information on the leader’s action12. Elec-
tors should be informed in a simple and understand-
able way before the end of the legislature on various 
aspects, including indicators related to the evolution 
of debt. In Portugal, there is already the custom of 
some municipalities presenting flyers and brochures 
in which, among other aspects, they describe activities 
and investments that have been carried out, and so a 
detailed explanation of how they were financed would 
be of great interest. This information would allow the 
electorate to understand the effect of these measures 
on their future tax bill and also see whether leaders are 
behaving according to the electoral cycle.
As to the other political-ideological variables, they 
were not confirmed as statistically significant with re-
gard to explaining debt levels in Portuguese munici-
palities. These results seem to show that, except for the 
election-year effect, other political and ideological is-
sues considered do not have a relevant effect on debt 
management at the local level, and so, the leader’s ac-
tion will be related more to the direct needs of the local 
population than to political-party orientations.
The variable to control the international financial 
crisis effect showed to be significant, with a positive 
impact on local authorities’ debt, which increased in 
the period 2008-2010. This was possibly also related 
to the general context of financial difficulties that was 
already affecting Portugal, leading to the financial bail-
out by IMF-ECB-EC in 2011.
All in all, one cannot confirm that the political-
ideological situation as a whole, at least as it has been 
defined in the variables in this paper for Portuguese 
municipalities, influences local authorities’ debt levels 
because from the circumstances considered, only the 
electoral cycle is relevant. Still, the paper offers inter-
esting lessons to be learned for other realities, espe-
cially other European countries, which might learn 
from the Portuguese context – the management of 
municipalities’ debt seems to be driven by factors other 
than political ones, namely, endogenous economic is-
sues (e.g., current expenditure and capital investment), 
which together with the electoral cycle seem to merit 
further analysis in future research.
From a methodological point of view, it could also 
be interesting to study the political-ideological de-
terminants of local authorities’ debt using dynamic 
panel data models, with the introduction of lagged 
variables13, preferably with longer periods of analysis, 
which would possibly contribute to an increase in the 
robustness of the findings.
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Endnotes
1 This is especially important in the Portuguese con-
text, in which a considerable amount of local debt 
relates to suppliers, apart from bank loans. Because 
local budgets and budgetary accomplishment are 
cash-based, debt to suppliers is not considered here, 
only cash inflows and outflows concerning loans.
2 Decree-Law n. 54-A/1999, of February 22.
3 Considering that agency theory is based fundamen-
tally on the principles implicit in the theory of public 
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choice, we chose not to develop the former autono-
mously.
4 This opposes the normative approach, which con-
siders that the community (citizens) act and react 
as an “organic” body, based on commonly held val-
ues (Mueller 1993).
5 Ashworth et al. (2005) defined, among others, a 
variable where 1 represented a coalition govern-
ment and 0 a single party. They also defined a vari-
able considering the number of parties in the coali-
tion. Note that for political strength, many authors 
use the Herfindahl index.
6 There were several data sources. Budgetary and fi-
nancial data were gathered from the Local Govern-
ment (official) Website (www.portalautarquico.pt/
portalautarquico/); population data were gathered 
from the National Statistics Institute database (www.
ine.pt/xportal/xmain?xpid=INE&xpgid=ine_
main); the website of the Elections National Com-
mission (www.cne.pt) was used for data regarding 
election results.
7 Law n. 2/2007, January 15. In 2014, a new financial 
regime of municipalities and intermunicipal bodies 
came to practice, as set out in Law n. 73/2013, Sep-
tember 3, for which the main changes compared to 
the previous one concerned the fact that the debt 
limit is now established in terms of gross (not net) 
amounts, as well as the requirement for municipali-
ties’ accounts to be audited.
8 All variables presented as a value in euros were con-
verted as a function of the total number of inhabit-
ants to allow comparison.
9 Socialist Party (PS), Portuguese Communist Party 
(PCP), Left Block (BE) and Ecology Party “Greens” 
(PEV) were considered left-wing parties. Social 
Democratic Party (PPD-PSD), CDS – Popular Par-
ty (CDS-PP) and Popular Monarchist Party (PPM) 
were considered right-wing parties.
10 In this period, local elections were held in 2005 and 
2009.
11 Considering the period of analysis, only 10%, on 
average, of municipalities were found to be led by 
minority Executives (www.cne.pt).
12 This seems to be confirmed by  Jorge, Moura e Sá, & 
Lourenço (2012).
13 According to Baltagi (2005), the introduction of 
these variables makes it possible to control the pos-
sible correlation between past values of the depen-
dent variable and contemporary values of the other 
explanatory variables, thus eliminating potential 
sources of estimator bias associated with that type 
of correlation.
